Rights in Collateral under U.C.C. 9-203 by Turner, Joseph W.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 3 Summer 1989 Article 6 
Summer 1989 
Rights in Collateral under U.C.C. 9-203 
Joseph W. Turner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph W. Turner, Rights in Collateral under U.C.C. 9-203, 54 MO. L. REV. (1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RIGHTS IN COLLATERAL UNDER
U.C.C. § 9-203
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with transactions
whereby one party (a debtor) grants a security interest to another party
(a secured party) in a piece of property. The security interest is normally
transferred by the debtor to the secured party to secure payment on an
obligation owed by the debtor to the secured party. U.C.C. section 9-203
provides three general requirements that must be met for a security interest
to attach. One of those requirements is that the debtor must have "rights
in the property" in which he conveys a security interest.'
The focus of this comment will be to determine the rights which one
might have in a piece of property that are sufficient to support a security
interest in that piece of property. Pursuant to section 9-203 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, "a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor
or third parties with respect to collateral and does not attach unless: (a)
the collateral is in possession of the secured party pursuant to an agreement,
or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral ... ; (b) value has been given; and (c) the debtor has
rights in the collateral." 2
Under section 9-203(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code a security
interest becomes enforceable against the debtor when requirements a, b,
and c above have all been met.' Thus, determining whether a debtor has
"rights in collateral" will inevitably be a crucial question in determining
whether a secured party will have the right to look to specific assets of
the debtor for payment of the subject debt upon default by the debtor.4
1. See generally U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1989). Throughout this comment the
following identification system will be used:
(a) Debtor-will refer to the party who is conveying the security interest.
(b) Secured Party-will refer to the party who is obtaining the security interest.
(c) Seller-will refer to the person selling collateral to the debtor.
2. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1989).
3. U.C.C. § 9-203(2) (1989). "A security interest attaches when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as
soon as all the events referred to in subsection 1 [signed security agreement, secured
party has given value, debtor has rights in the collateral] have taken place unless
specific agreement postpones attachment." Id.
4. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) provides that when a debtor is in default under a
security agreement a secured party may enforce his security interest to satisfy the
debt. That is, he may take possession of the collateral (U.C.C. § 9-503), sell the
collateral (U.C.C. § 9-504(1)) and use the proceeds of such sale to satisfy the debt
(U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a)). U.C.C. §§ 9-501(11), -503, -504(1) (1989).
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It has been noted that the "'rights in collateral' language merely state[s]
a truism, namely, that the debtor normally can only convey something
once he has something .... " Some interests are unquestionably sufficient
to support a security agreement; that is, if a debtor has full legal title to
a piece of property it can hardly be argued that the debtor's rights are
not sufficient to support a security interest,6 Conversely, mere possession
of property in which the debtor has no ownership rights does not afford
the debtor the right to convey a security interest in that property.
7 In fact,
since the adoption of Article 9, courts have used this requirement to
invalidate security interests held by secured parties. Thus, it is important
to be aware of the types of interests that a debtor might have in collateral
and whether those interests will be deemed sufficient to support a security
interest,
This comment will focus on four common types of property interests
and will discuss whether those interests are sufficient to support a security
interest. The interests examined will be: (1) a debtor's contractual interest
in property; (2) a debtor's interest as a bailor of property; (3) a debtor's
interest in corporate owned property; and (4) a debtor's interest in property
which he owns jointly with another person.
I, DEBTORS' PROPERTY INTERESTS
A, Debtor's Contractual Interest in Acquiring Property
1, Background
Many times debtors convey a security interest in property which they
do not yet own. Uniform Commercial Code section 9-204(1) provides that
5. J, WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORI COMMERCIAL CODE 988 (1988) (here-
inafter Wnm, UCC). See also R, HUMAN, J. McDONNELl, & S. NicKLES, COMMON
LAW AND EQUITY UNDER TH UNIFoRM COMORCIAL CODE § 18-2 (1985) (hereinafter
Hiu mAN, UCC). "The qualifying language 'to the extent' is justified by a fun-
damental principle of common law and common sense, which is that one cannot
convey rights greater than one's own .... The 9-203(1)(c) requirement that the
debtor have 'rights in the collateral' is simply an embodiment of the common-law
precept that one cannot convey what one does not have. A corollary rule also
obtains under article 9, although not as clearly and with many exceptions. The
rule is that one cannot convey rights greater than one's own." Id.
6, See HLmAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-3 (1985). See generally WMTE,
UCC, supra note 5, at 987.
7. See HuLmAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-2 n.6 (1985) (citing Cain v,
Country Club Delicatessen of Saybrook, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441
(1964)), Disch v, Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d
1097 (1977). See also WI, UCC, supra note 5. "If the goods are entirely owned
by a third party, mere acquisition of possession by the debtor will not be enough."
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"a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by
the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral. '" For
instance, a secured party might have an agreement with a debtor which
grants the secured party a security interest in "all equipment of the debtor
now owned or hereafter acquired." 9 The security interest, in such a situation,
would attach to any item of equipment owned by the debtor at the time
the security interest was created or acquired by the debtor after the time
of the creation of the security interest.10
In analyzing the point at which a security interest attaches to after-
acquired property, one must look at each of the requirements of U.C.C.
section 9-203(1). That is, in order for a security interest to attach (be
enforceable against a debtor)"' the three elements of U.C.C. section 9-
203(1) must be met: there must be a security agreement containing the
debtor's signature, 2 the secured party must have given value, 3 and the
debtor must have rights in the collateral.'4
Close analysis will show that a secured party's security interest in after-
acquired property will attach to such property when the debtor obtains
rights in the property. The other two requirements of U.C.C. section 9-
203(1) have already been met, 5 therefore, at the time the debtor acquires
rights in property, the secured party's security interest will attach imme-
diately to that property. But determining when a debtor "obtains rights
in collateral" can be complicated. It is a relatively simple case when a
debtor orders, pays for, and receives delivery of property in a single
8. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1989).
9. U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1989) defines equipment as goods that "are used or
bought for use primarily in business (including farming or a profession) or by a
debtor who is a nonprofit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency
or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or
consumer goods."
10. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1), 9-203(2), 9-204(1) (1989).
11. U.C.C. § 9-203(2) (1989).
12. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1989).
13. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1989).
14. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c) (1989).
15. The original security agreement containing the after acquired property
clause will presumably be signed and probably contains a sufficient description of
the after acquired property. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1989). U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1989)
requires that a secured party give value in order to obtain a security interest in
property of a debtor. In exchange for the security interest the secured party will
have given value in the form of a loan to the debtor. The loan will satisfy the
requirement that the secured party give value to obtain a security interest in property
later acquired by the debtor. U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1989) states: "Except as otherwise
provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections (sections 3-
303, 4-208 and 4-209) a person gives value for rights if he acquires them ...
0) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a preexisting claim."
Thus, § 9-203(1)(0) will have been satisfied.
1989]
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transaction. The analysis becomes much more complex if the debtor first
enters into a contract to purchase property from a seller but receives
delivery and pays for the property at a later time. The rest of this subsection
will discuss the secured party's rights in an asset vis-A-vis the debtor-
purchaser and the seller at different times in the process of contracting to
purchase the asset, receiving delivery of the asset, and then paying for the
asset.
2. Secured Party v. Seller's Right to Reclaim
The easiest way to explore the rights of each party will be through
examination of hypothetical situations. Assume that a secured party has
a security interest in all of debtor's trucks now owned or hereafter acquired. 16
Assume further that this security interest is granted by the debtor to the
secured party in a writing signed by the debtor on January 1, 1989. In a
contemporaneous agreement the secured party loans the debtor one million
dollars. The requirements of U.C.C. section 9-203(I)(a) (written security
agreement signed by the debtor) and section 9-203(1)(b) (secured party must
give value) have been met. Thus, a security interest will immediately attach
in favor of the secured party in any trucks which the debtor has "rights
in" at the time the security agreement is executed and the loan is made.
Now assume that on January 15, 1989, the buyer enters into a contract
with ABC Company to purchase a truck. On January 17, 1989, ABC
Company sends buyer the truck in exchange for buyer's promise to pay
$15,000 on February 15, 1989. The secured party's interest in the new
truck will certainly attach at the time the debtor receives delivery. 7 What
16. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of after acquired
property clause.
17. The seller might be tempted to alter this result by including a clause
that no title shall pass to the buyer until the seller has been paid. U.C.C. § 2-
401 (1989) provides that "any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation of a security interest." That is, if the seller does not take a security
interest in the property sold or attempts to prevent title from passing to the buyer
until after the goods have been paid for, the buyer will have unencumbered ownership
rights to the collateral. Even if the secured party did retain a security interest in
the collateral, the debtor would still have rights in the collateral and could further
encumber it. See HiLLmAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-2 (1985).
The priority conflict between the seller of the property and the secured party
would be resolved by referring to U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1989) which provides "a
purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority over
a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase
money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral or within ten days thereafter." So, if the seller files a financing
statement in the appropriate office (U.C.C. § 9-302 (1989)) before, or within ten
days after, the debtor receives delivery of the collateral his claim for the purchase
price will be senior to the secured party's claim. Nevertheless, the secured party
will have a security interest in the collateral.
[Vol. 54
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if the seller learns on January 31, 1989, that the buyer is insolvent? Section
2-702 of the U.C.C. provides that
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten
days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made
to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the
ten day limitation does not apply.8
Thus, it would appear that the seller could reclaim the truck from the
buyer under U.C.C. section 2-702(2) and effectively extinguish the secured
party's security interest. But U.C.C. section 2-702(3) probably alters this
result. That section states that "the seller's right to reclaim under [2-702(2)]
is subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser under this Article (section 2-403)"' 19 Clearly the secured
party is not a buyer in the ordinary course, 20 but he apparently is a good
faith purchaser. 2' Therefore the seller's right of reclamation would be
subordinate to the security interest of the secured party.
For instance, in In re Bensar,n2 BancOhio National Bank (BNB) had
a security interest in all inventory of Bensar Company, Inc. (Bensar) now
owned or hereafter acquired.2 United States Billiards Company, Inc. (U.S.B.)
sent pool tables to Bensar.? These pool tables constituted inventory in
Bensar's hands so the security interest of BNB attached to the pool tables. 25
U.S.B. learned that Bensar was insolvent on June 13, 1983.26 U.S.B. had
not yet received payment for the pool tables. An officer of USB called a
Bensar employee on June 16, 1983 and demanded reclamation. 27 Thus, the
critical question was whose right in the pool tables was senior: BNB's
security interest or U.S.B.'s right of reclamation. The court held that since
BNB's "after acquired interest in the debtor's [Bensar's] inventory was
18. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1989).
19. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1989) (emphasis added).
20. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1989) defines buyer in the ordinary course as "a
person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in
ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind ......
See In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc., 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
645 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1981) (secured creditor is not a buyer in the ordinary course
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code).
21. In re Bensar Co., 36 Bankr. 699, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) ("secured
creditors who act in good faith qualify as good faith purchasers"). U.C.C. § 1-
201(19) (1989) defines "good faith" as meaning "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned."
22. 36 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
23. Id. at 700.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 699.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 701.
19891
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created through a voluntary transaction, and since the bank has acted in
good faith, its rights as a good faith purchaser are superior to those of
U.S.B. as a reclaiming seller under U.C.C. section 2-702(3). ' 18 The result
reached by the court in In re Bensar is in accord with the results reached
by other courts addressing this issue, 29
Should courts addressing this question come to this result? As recognized
by White and Summers, "equities between competing claimants may be
fought out in the name of this phrase ('rights in the collateral').," 0 It is
true that a textual consideration of U.C.C. section 2-702(2) and U.C.C.
section 2-702(3) will result in a finding in favor of the secured party. The
policy of favoring a good faith purchaser over a reclaiming seller is to
promote commerce. That is, customers would probably be reluctant to
purchase a pool table from Bensar if they believed that a seller could
subsequently take the pool table away from them if Bensar became insolvent
or defaulted on his obligation to pay the seller. Similarly, a creditor would
be much less likely to loan money collateralized by the pool tables currently
held by Bensar if they believed this security interest would be subordinate
to an unpaid seller's right to reclaim.3 1 In order to promote commerce the
rights of secured parties acting in good faith and buyers in the ordinary
course are elevated above the rights of sellers asserting a right of reclamation.
A strong argument can be made, however, that these policy consid-
erations are not applicable when the contest is between the right of a seller
to reclaim and the right of a secured party in after acquired collateral.
For instance, in In re Bensar, BNB probably did not change its position
in reliance (i.e., loan money to Bensar) on the pool tables that would later
be sent to Bensar by U.S.B. The result in In re Bensar would be even
more tenuous if the secured party's security interest was in an asset that
does not turn over in the ordinary course of business. Clearly, in the case
of an after acquired security interest in a non-revolving asset, a secured
party will not have changed positions in reliance on a debtor's later
acquisition of the collateral.3 2 Therefore, a secured party who obtains an
28. Id. at 703.
29. See e.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. Wmr, UCC, supra note 5, at 990.
31. Under U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1989), "the seller's right to reclaim under
subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser under this Article . .. .
If Bensar defaulted on its obligation to the seller it would have voidable title
to the pool tables. Under U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1989), "[a] person with voidable title
has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."
32. In fact, because of the effects of U.C.C. § 9-312(3) and U.C.C. § 9-
312(4) most sophisticated secured parties will not loan money in reliance on later
acquisitions of inventory by the debtor to secure the loan. If the seller of the
inventory takes proper steps his security interest will be senior to that of the secured
[Vol. 54
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interest in an asset of a debtor through the operation of an after-acquired
property clause does not have the same need for protection from a seller's
right of reclamation as does a purchaser of the asset or a secured party
who loans money collateralized originally by the asset.
3. Secured Party v, Seller-Goods Identified to the Contract but not
Delivered
The prior cases and examples have revolved around the secured party's
rights vis-d-vis the seller after the debtor has taken delivery of the property.
Now suppose that the secured party obtains a security interest in all of
debtor's trucks now owned or hereafter acquired. Assume that the debtor
contracts to purchase a truck from the seller. What are the rights of the
secured party vis-i-vis the seller after the debtor contracts to purchase the
truck from the seller but before delivery occurs?
U.C.C. section 2-501 provides that "Itihe buyer [debtor] obtains a
special property and an insurable interest in goods by identification of
existing goods as goods to which [a] contract refers ... -"I "These non-
title interests may in themselves be sufficient rights in collateral to support
a security interest in the goods" in the secured party's favor.34 In the
example set forth in the previous paragraph the debtor will have rights in
the truck sufficient to support a security interest in favor of the secured
party. Is there any value in having a security interest in the truck founded
only on the debtor's insurable or special property interest in that truck?
party. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1989) provides that:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over
a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority
in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before delivery of the inventory
to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) . . . [holder of conflicting security interests are sent notice of seller's
intention to sell debtor inventory];
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification
within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory;
and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor,
describing such inventory by item or type.
33. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (1989). Section 2-501(1) goes on to provide that: "In
the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs
(b) if the contract is for the sale of ... goods ... when [the] goods are
shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract
refers . . ."
34. HrLuAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-14 (citing In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327 (Bankr. D. Me. 1968)).
1989]
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"Clearly the answer is yes if the [truck] suffers some casualty that is
covered by insurance payable to the secured party or the debtor."35 Under
U.C.C. sections 9-306(1) and (2) the amount received from the insurance
company would be proceeds and thus the secured party would be entitled
to look to the insurance money to satisfy the debt.36
What if the truck is not lost or destroyed in an event covered by
insurance but instead the debtor breaches the contract to purchase the
truck? Will the secured party have a security interest in the truck senior
to the rights of the seller? "The secured party will rely on the [residual]
rule of Section 9-201 that a security agreement is effective against the
debtor and third parties (including the seller) 'except as otherwise provided
by this act."' 3 7 The secured party will argue that Article 9 does not
"otherwise provide" that a secured party's security interest is subordinate
to a title holder's interest. But this argument overlooks the obvious; "[n]othing
in Article 9 supports this assumption that once a security interest attaches,
it exists independently of the debtor's rights on which it is based ....'"'
Thus, when the debtor breaches the contract for purchase of the truck he
loses all interest in the truck.
The rights of the secured party may be greatly enhanced if the seller,
rather than the buyer, breaches. Assume for instance that the value of the
truck is $40,000 at the time the contract is made and increases to $50,000
prior to delivery. The seller decides not to follow through with the contract
because he can sell the truck for more elsewhere. There are certain situations
in which the debtor would be entitled to force the seller to follow through
with the contract. 9 If the debtor chooses to do this he will ultimately have
full possession and title to the truck and the secured party's security interest
will clearly attach to the truck via the after-acquired property clause.
35. HiLrAN,, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-5 (1985).
36. U.C.C. § 9-306(l) (1989) provides that proceeds include:
[Wihatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other dis-
position of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable
to a person other than a party to the security agreement. Money, checks,
deposit accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds' all other proceeds are
non cash proceeds.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1989) provides in pertinent part that "a security interest
... continues in any identifiable proceeds ... received by the debtor."
37. HLMAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-5 (1985) (citing U.C.C. § 9-201
(1985)) (emphasis added).
38. Hn.MuAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-5 (1985).
39. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1989) states that "specific performance may be decreed
where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances."
U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (1989) states that "[t]he buyer has a right of replevin for
goods identified to the contract if.after reasonable effort he is unable to effect
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The debtor may decide, however, to sue for damages rather than replevin
or specific performance. He or she would be entitled to recover the excess
of the fair market value of the truck over the contract price-$10,000 in
this case.4° Would the secured party's security interest attach to the $10,000
recovered by the debtor as damages? The case law on this point is scant.
It would appear, though, that the best result would be to allow the secured
party's security interest in the truck to attach by operation of U.C.C.
section 9-306(2) to the damage award recovered by the debtor. This result
is sound for two related reasons. First, the debtor has, in a sense, recovered
the $10,000 judgment upon disposition of the collateral. Section 9-306(1)
defines proceeds to include "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral . . . . "4' As discussed above,
the secured party's security interest will "continue in any identifiable pro-
ceeds." ' 42 Thus, a fair reading of the statute would lead one to conclude
that the secured party's security interest, in the above hypothetical, should
continue in the $10,000 recovered by the debtor from the seller.43
The second reason for allowing the secured party's security interest to
continue in the $10,000 is that this would closely approximate the positions
of the parties if the sale had in fact occurred. 44 The positions of each of
the parties had the sale been made would be as follows: (1) the secured
party, as shown above, would have had a security interest in the truck.
Assuming the debtor borrowed the money to pay the $40,000 and further
assuming that the truck had a $50,000 fair market value, the value of
secured party's security interest would be $10,000. This is true because
whether the debtor borrowed the $40,000 from the seller or from a third
party lender, the secured party's security interest would be subordinate to
the seller's or third party lender's security interest because of the purchase
money security interest rules of sections 9-312(3), (4);4 and (2) had the
40. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIMs-DA)MAGEs, EQuITY, RESTITUTION 785
(1973).
41. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1989) (emphasis added).
42. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1989).
43. The case seems particularly clear when the debtor in fact has an Article
2 right to obtain the specific goods. If, in our hypothetical, the debtor has a right
to obtain the truck but instead seeks to recover a damage amount, his rights in
the truck are gone forever. This is true because the debtor has elected his remedy.
See generally D. DoBs, supra note 40, § 1.5. Thus, in exchange for his rights in
the truck the debtor has received $10,000. As mentioned before, the $10,000 is
proceeds under § 9-306(1) and the secured party's security interest continues in the
$10,000 under § 9-306(2).
44. D. DOBBS, supra note 40, 786. "The traditional goal in awarding damages
for breach of contract is to award a sum that will put the non-breaching party
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed."
Id.
45. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1989). See also U.C.C. § 9-107 (1989), which states
1989]
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contract been carried out, the debtor would have had a $50,000 truck
subject to a $40,000 lien in favor of a purchase money lender. He would
have had $10,000 in value of the truck over and above the purchase money
lien. The $10,000 would have clearly been subject to the lien of the secured
party. Thus, in order to place the debtor in the same position he would
have been in had the contract been carried out, the secured party's lien
should be allowed to attach to the $10,000 damage recovery,46
B. Debtor's Interest as Bailee of Property Belonging to Another
1. Background
There are a number of different definitions of bailment. 47 "A bailment
may be defined as a contract by which the possession of personal property
[A] security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent
that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
46. There is one other important implication in determining whether con-
tractual rights in collateral are sufficient to support a security interest. U.C.C. §
9-103(l)(b) (1989) states:
[Elxcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect
of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in collateral are
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the
last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the security interest
is perfected or unperfected.
The case of Joint Holdings & Trading Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank of North
Carolina, 50 Cal. App. 3d 159, 123 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1975), illustrates the application
of 9-103. Apparently in March 1972 and September of 1973, Brennan Corporation
(hereinafter Brennan) granted First Union National Bank of North Carolina (here-
inafter Bank) a security interest in all of its inventory now owned or hereinafter
acquired. Id. at 160, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Bank properly filed financing statements
reflecting its security interest in the appropriate office under North Carolina law.
A shipment of trousers were being sent to Brennan in North Carolina from American
Samoa via California in October of 1973. Id. at 161, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Joint
Holdings and Trading Company levied on the trousers while they were in California,
Id. at 162, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Thus, the conflict is between a lien creditor
and a secured party perfected under the laws of North Carolina. The court found
in favor of the lien creditor saying that in order to protect itself the bank should
have perfected its security interest in "the jurisdiction where the goods are when
the interest attaches." Id. at 165, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 523. In this case the trousers
were in Taiwan when the security interest attached thus the bank should have been
perfected under the law of Taiwan. Note that implicit in this holding is the acceptance
by the court of the notion that contractual right in property may support a security
interest. See also WwiM, UCC, supra note 5, at 1050-51.
47. Hin. iAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-18 (1985). 10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/6
1989] RIGHTS IN COLLATERAL
is temporarily transferred from the owner to another .. . .,4s A bailee
does not acquire title to the property but he does possess "a number of
rights with respect to the bailed property. Since he is entitled to possession,
a bailee 'has a right to protect that possession .... So he may bring [an
action in] replevin for its possession, or trover for its value when it is so
destroyed or injured that the benefits of possession are lessened. ' ' 49
Can a bailee of goods transfer a security interest in those goods? Some
courts have suggested that he cannot.50 Hillman states that it is "wrong
to suggest, as some courts have, that no bailee ever acquires rights on
which to predicate a security interest in bailed property. . . [Tihe quantum
and significance of these rights will vary depending on the facts of each
case, and, under the usual rule, no one can convey rights greater than his
own." 51 Thus, a bailee may always create a security interest in the bailed
goods to the extent of his interest in those goods; however, as a general
rule, he may not create a security interest in bailed goods that infringes
in any way on the bailor's ownership rights in the goods.
Secured parties are unsatisfied with this result. Many times they are
unaware that the interest of the debtor (bailee) in the collateral is limited
to a balee's interest. Therefore, they "have searched the Code for exceptions
to the usual rule that a security interest given by a bailee" goes only so
far as "the bailee's limited rights in the balled goods."52 Secured parties
have pointed to two particular provisions which they believe subordinate
the rights of the bailor/owner of goods to their security interest. The two
provisions most often used are U.C.C sections 2-403(1) and (2).
Section 2-403(1) provides in pertinent part that "a person with voidable
title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for
value." 53 As discussed above, an article 9 secured party is a good faith
purchaser.54 If a bailee has voidable title to balled goods then arguably a
secured party's security interest in those goods should be senior to the
bailor's ownership interest in the goods by operation of section 2-403(1).
Actually, a bailee of goods does not obtain voidable title to those goods. 5
48. W. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AN CARMRS §
1 (1929).
49. HLmA., UCC, supra note 5, § 18-19 (citing W. ELLIOTT, supra note
48, § 12, at 23).
50. In re Farmer Grain Exch. Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1054
(W.D. Wis. 1976); Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 46
Cal. App. 3d 807, 120 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1975); Risch v. Raven Transfer & Storage
Co., 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977).
51. HLMAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-19.
52. Id. §§ 18-20.
53. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1989).
54. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55. HLmAN, UCC, supra note 5, § 18-25 (citing A. DoBrE, HANDBOOK ON
TnE LAv OF BAILmENTS AND CARRIERs § 3, at 6 (1914)); 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATIsE
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Therefore, section 2-403(1) does not change the general rule that a bailee
of goods cannot convey a security interest in those goods that is senior
to the ownership rights of the bailor.
Section 2-403(2) provides that "any entrusting of possession of goods
to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer
all rights of the entrustee to a buyer in the ordinary course of business."
This section does not help the secured parties. It only allows a merchant
(bailee) to transfer good title (i.e., free and clear of the ownership rights
of the bailor) to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Secured parties
are not buyers in the ordinary course of business.16 Therefore, section 2-
403(2) does not work to promote the security interest above the ownership
rights of bailors.
Secured parties have been unsuccessful in convincing courts that these
Article 2 provisions subordinate bailor-owner rights to the security interests
of secured parties. There is a common law argument, however, that secured
parties may find helpful in accomplishing this result. At least one judge
in In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc.5 7 was persuaded that the transaction
between the alleged bailor and bailee was not a bailment at all; rather it
was a sale. The buyer, then, had the power to grant a security interest
to a third party lender which was superior to any interest which the seller
might have retained.
The facts of Sitkin are important to an understanding of the case.
"Prior to its bankruptcy Sitkin Smelting and Refining Company (Sitkin)
was in the business of processing industrial waste for the recovery of
precious and base metals." 58 Sitkin entered into an agreement with Eastman
Kodak (Kodak) whereby Kodak would provide to Sitkin 500,000 pounds
of industrial waste.5 9 Sitkin processed the waste and, according to the
majority, was bound to purchase the "silver extract recovered on such
processing." ' 6 The film waste was to be picked up in lots of 36,000 pounds
each by Sitkin. 6' The contract called for a settlement, which was a deter-
mination of the amounts owed by Sitkin, after it processed each lot.
C.I.T. Corporation (C.I.T.) claimed a security interest in the inventory
of Sitkin.6 2 C.I.T. claimed that the security interest in the inventory of
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10-32 (rev. ed. 1936); W. ELLoTT, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF BALMENTS AND CARRIERS § 10 (1929); E. GODDARD, THE LAW OF
BAmLmNTS AND CARumus §§ 7-8 (L. Culin 2d ed. 1928); J. ScHOULER, THE LAW
OF BAiLmENTS § 1, at 1 (1905); W. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMfENTS
AND C ARmss § 1-2 (1896).
56. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Id. at 1218.
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Sitkin gave them an interest in the film waste which was senior to the
interest of Kodak. The court in Sitkin stated that the outcome of the
priority dispute between Kodak and C.I.T. turned "upon whether the
transaction between the two companies [Sitkin and Kodak] was a bailment
or a sale."63 The majority in Sitkin held that the transaction between Kodak
and Sitkin constituted a bailment rather than a sale.64 Thus, the security
interest of the secured party, C.I.T., was subordinate to the ownership
interest of Kodak.
Judge Clark, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's characteri-
zation of the transaction between Kodak and Sitkin as a bailment. 65 Judge
Clark first found that:
[The] goods to be sold by Kodak to Sitkin were the 500,000 pounds
of film waste which contained recoverable silver. There was no sale or
purchase of just the silver content in the film waste. The silver content
in the film waste, which could only be salvaged on processing, was to
serve only as a pricing mechanism for the sale of the 500,000 pounds of
film waste."
Judge Clark pointed out that the majority, in classifying the transaction
between Sitkin and Kodak as a bailment, relied heavily on two factors:
(1) that Kodak had the option to require the film waste be processed or
returned; and (2) that the evidence indicated the film waste was being
stored by Kodak on Sitkin's behalf.6 7 Judge Clark did not find either of
these two factors to be present in this case.
The majority mentioned several aspects of the relationship between
Sitkin and Kodak which indicated a bailment rather than a sale. 68 Judge
Clark first noted that the majority found "support for a bailment in
Sitkin's agreement to assume responsibility for the waste by picking it up
at Kodak's facility in New York and transporting it to warehouses in
Alabama that Sitkin had leased." '69 Judge Clark pointed out that this factor
"is just as consistent with a sales transaction as it [is] with a bailment."' 70
The majority also stated that the fact the goods were kept in Kodak cartons
in the Sitkin Warehouse indicates a bailment rather than a sale. Judge
Clark speculated that the film waste may have been stored this way only
because this was the most practical way to store the waste; that is, "[tihere
would be no reason for Sitkin to assume the added expense and trouble
63. Id. at 1217.






70. Id. at 1221.
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of removing the film from its cartons and crossing out Kodak's brand
name before [Sitkin] began the salvaging process.'"'
Judge Clark's dissent in Sitkin is authority for the proposition that
under the right circumstances a transaction which is outwardly a bailment
may be held by a court to be in substance a sale. Thus, a secured party
attempting to defeat the claim of an alleged bailor might successfully argue
that the bailment is in fact a sale and the security interest in the collateral
is, therefore, superior to any interest retained by the seller.7 2 The prospects
for this line of attack are certainly much more promising than arguing
that a bailment in fact existed but the secured party's rights are nevertheless
junior to the rights of the bailor under U.C.C. section 2-403,
C. Corporate Assets as Security for Personal Debts
Corporate officers and employees have, in the past, attempted to use
corporate assets to secure personal debts. The question in these cases
inevitably becomes "does the party asserting a security interest in the
corporate asset really have a security interest in the asset at all?" Two of
the requirements of section 9-203 are relevant in answering this question.
Section 9-203(1)(a) requires that "the debtor ... sign] a security agreement
.... -71 It is important to recognize that the debtor for purposes of section
9-203 is not the obligor. The term debtor, in section 9-203, refers to "the
owner of collateral even though he is not the person who owes payment
or performance of the obligation secured." 74 As a second requirement,
section 9-203(1)(C) states that "the debtor [must] have rights in the col-
lateral."75
Courts may analyze these cases by asking whether the corporate debtor
or an agent of the corporate debtor has signed the security agreement. On
the other hand, a court might find the critical inquiry to be whether the
employee or officer obligor on the note had sufficient rights in the corporate
property to convey a security interest in that property to a third party.
Regardless of the way the court frames its inquiry, the issue is the same-
whether a corporate employee, or officer, who does not own the corporate
asset being pledged, has the authority to convey a security interest in the
asset to a- third party.
For instance, in In re Terminal Moving & Storage Co., Inc.7 6 (Terminal),
Herbert Walker purchased all of the shares of Terminal Moving and Storage
71. Id.
72. It should be noted that if the seller retains a purchase money security
interest such interest will be senior to all other security interests in the collateral
if properly perfected. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
73. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1989).
74. Official comment to U.C.C. § 9-112 (1989).
75. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1989).
76. 631 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 54
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Company (TMS) from Terminal Distribution Centers (TDC),77 Walker paid
for the shares by giving TDC $10,000 in cash and a $90,000 note.78 "On
the same day [TMS] under the authority of the new president and sole
shareholder, Walker, executed a security agreement in favor of [TDC]
pledging all of the assets of [TMS] to secure the [$90,000] promissory note
of Walker."79 TDC properly perfected its security interest8 0
About four years later TMS "filed a chapter XI plan for corporate
reorganization."'" The trustee in bankruptcy asserted that the security
agreement of TMS in favor of TDC was ultra vires under Arkansas law
and was therefore void and of no effect . 2 The court rejected this argument
and held that the trustee lacked standing to assert an ultra vires defense. 3
The court further stated that "the assent of all the shareholders [i.e.,
Walker] to the security agreement bars any claim in the right of the
corporation to defeat it.' 114
Compare Terminal with the case of Northwestern Bank v. First Virginia
Bank of Damascus.5 Northwestern Bank presents facts very similar to
those found in Terminal, however, the decision of the court in Northwestern
Bank is different than the decision in Terminal.
In Northwestern Bank, Mr. Shepherd and Mr. McElwee formed a
corporation called Ray Shepherd Lumber Company (Company). 6 Shepherd
served as president of the Company,87 On October 20, 1978, the Company
purchased a Caterpillar 920 Wheel Loader (Loader) using funds loaned by
Northwest Bank.8 Northwest Bank acquired a security interest and filed
in North Carolina, the location of the loader. 9 In February or March of
1982 the loader was moved into Virginia. 9° In March of 1982 Shepherd
and two others applied for a personal loan at the First Virginia Bank of
Damascus (Virginia Bank).9' Since this was a personal loan, the Company
was in no way obligated on the note. Shepherd caused Virginia Bank to
believe he owned the loader and would be willing to convey a security






83. Id. at 550.
84. Id. See also Widett v. Pilgrims Trust Co., 143 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 1958).
"The assent of all the stockholders to the giving of a mortgage [by the corporation]
bars any claim, in the right of the corporation to defeat it. " Id. at 170.
85. 585 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1984).
86. Id. at 426.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 426-27,
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interest in the loader to secure the note. 92 Virginia Bank determined that
Mr. Shepherd did own the loader and approved a loan for $25,000, taking
a security interest in the loader. 93 The security interest was perfected by
filing a financing statement according to Virginia law. 94
The Company defaulted on its note payable to Northwest Bank. Shep-
herd defaulted on the note payable to Virginia Bank. 9 The conflict then
was between Northwest Bank and Virginia Bank to determine which bank
had the senior claim to the loader. The court found in favor of Northwest
Bank stating that Virginia Bank did not have a valid security interest in
the loader.96
The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the court noted that
in order to have a valid security interest the debtor must sign the security
agreement. When the obligor on the note and the owner of collateral are
not the same person, the owner of the collateral must sign the security
agreement. 97 In this case, the Company owned the asset and no one
representing the Company signed the security agreement. 98 Therefore, the
security interest of Virginia Bank never attached to the loader because of
a failure to comply with U.C.C. section 9-203(1)(a). 9
The court also stated that Virginia Bank's security interest failed for
another reason: "Generally a debtor must have rights in property before
he can create a security interest in it . . . ."10 The company, rather than
the debtor, Mr. Shepherd, was the owner of the property. The court did
state that a "debtor possesses 'rights in the collateral' if the true owner
agrees to the debtor's use of property as security or if the true owner is
estopped to deny the creation or existence of the security interest."' 0'
Neither consent nor estoppel was present in this case.' °2 Therefore Virginia
Bank's security interest never attached because Mr. Shepherd did not have
rights in the loader.
The cases discussed above indicate that courts will probably make a
two step inquiry into transactions involving a pledge of corporate assets
to secure personal employee, officer, or shareholder debts: 1) has the proper
party signed the security agreement, and 2) does the debtor have rights in
the collateral as pointed out by the Northwestern Bank court. Nevertheless,
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security agreement. A secured party may be able to argue either that the
corporation consented to the use of its property as collateral or that the
corporation should be estopped from denying that the obligor is the true
owner of the property. 103 If the secured party is able to convince the court
that the corporation has signed the security agreement, consented to the
use of its property as security for a debt, or is estopped from denying
that a valid security agreement exists, then the secured party's security
agreement should stand .' 4
Estoppel can be used by secured parties against people asserting that
the security interest is invalid. The word estoppel "means simply that
someone is stopped from claiming or saying something; usually he is stopped
from claiming a lawful claim and usually this is because of some prior
inconsistent statement or activity."' 15 The concept of estoppel is illustrated
by the case of In re Matter of Pubs Inc. of Champaign.'°6 In Pubs, two
officers (Officers) of a corporation (Corporatiofi) granted a security interest
to the Bank of Illinois (Bank) in certain equipment (Equipment) which
they owned. 0 7 The court found that "it was the intention of both [the
Officers] Hein and Richardson to borrow the money personally from the
Bank, grant a security interest in the Equipment to the Bank and then
transfer the Equipment to the Corporation" subject to the Bank's security
interest. 03 On November 5, 1976, Hein executed a security agreement
granting the Bank a security interest in the Equipment.? 9 Richardson did
not sign the security agreement until November 16, 1976.110 The Bank
deleted the November 5 date from the security agreement and substituted
November 16, 1976."' The security interest was granted to the Bank as
of record on November 16, 1976. Hein and Richardson "executed a bill
of sale and a conveyance of the [Equipment] to the [Corporation]" on
103. See infra note 107.
104. Some courts might make a third inquiry. Did the funds borrowed go
to the benefit of the corporation? If they did not, then the security interest might
be held invalid. See In re Just for the Fun of It of Tennessee, Inc., 7 Bankr. 166
(E.D. Tenn. 1980). This case deals with the analogous situation of the validity of
a real estate mortgage on corporate property to secure a non-corporate personal
obligation of an officer of the corporation.
105. D. DOBBS, REMEDis-DAMAGES, EQUITY, REsTITUTION (1973). See also
Avco Delta Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United States, 459 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1972).
"Whatever title the defendant has must rest on the doctrine of estoppel. This is
an equitable doctrine taken over by the law. It is based upon the conduct of the
true owner, whereby he has allowed another to appear as the owner, or as having
full power of disposition over the property, so that an innocent person is led into
dealing with such apparent owner." Id. at 440-41.
106. 618 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1980).
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November 9, 1976.112 The bill of sale stated that the equipment was being
conveyed to the Corporation subject to the Bank's security interest." 3
Nevertheless, the Corporation argued that at the time the security interest
in the equipment was conveyed to the Bank, (November 16, 1976), the
Officers no longer had any rights in the Equipment because of the transfer
to the Corporation on November 9, 1976. The court rejected this argument.
The court noted that "one may be estopped from asserting his rights if
his words or conduct have led another party to take some action which
he would not otherwise have taken but for the words or conduct of the
estopped party.' 1 4 The Corporation was estopped because it knew the
Bank thought the corporation was receiving a valid security interest in the
Equipment but failed to tell the Bank otherwise. This prevented the Bank
from protecting itself by not disbursing the loan proceeds. The court held:
[T]he corporation is estopped to deny the validity of the bank's security
interest. [The Corporation's] title to the property was clearly evidenced
by the November 9, 1976, bill of sale which recited that [the Corporation]
took the collateral subject to the Bank's security interest. Having been
put on notice by the recital of the bill of sale [the Corporation] is estopped
to deny the recited security interest by claiming an interest superior to
it.ls
It is also possible that a court could find that a debtor has rights in
collateral as a result of the true owner consenting to the debtor's use of
the property as collateral. For instance, in the Pubs case the court could
have based its holding on a finding that the corporation consented to the
officers' use of the equipment as collateral. Consent is similar to the
concept of estoppel. The difference between consent and estoppel is that
to find consent a court must examine the true owner's conduct toward
the debtor whereas, with estoppel, the court focuses on the true owner's
conduct toward the secured party.
D. Debtor's Interest as Joint Owner of Property
There are essentially three ways that a debtor might jointly own a
piece of property with another: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and
tenancy by the entirety." 6 A debtor can clearly mortgage his interest in
property which he owns as a tenant in common 17 or a joint tenant."'
Jurisdictions disagree on whether one spouse can unilaterally transfer his
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 438.
115. Id.
116. See generally R. CUNNINGMHI, W. STOEBUCK AND D. WHIAN, THE
LAw oF PRoPERTY § 5.1 (1984) [hereinafter Tim LAW or PROPERTY].
117. See Z.V. Pate, Inc. v. Kollock, 202 S.C. 522, 25 S.E.2d 728 (1943).
118. See generally Tim LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 116, § 5.4.
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interest in property which he holds as a tenant by the entirety." 9 Tenants
by the entirety, only husbands and wives, hold under a single title with
rights of survivorship."'' 2
Conflicts commonly arise between a nondebtor tenant by the entirety
and a creditor of the debtor spouse. The debtor spouse will have given
the creditor a security interest in the property without the consent of the
nondebtor spouse. The question becomes what rights, if any, does the
creditor have by reason of such conveyance? Courts have answered this
question in three different ways. Some courts have held that a spouse
acting alone is powerless to convey any interest in tenancy by the entirety
property.' 2' Other jurisdictions have held that a secured party's security
interest may attach to tenancy by the entirety property without the consent
of both spouses. But these states have also held that if the secured party
did have to foreclose and sell the debtor's interest in the property "a
purchaser at [such a sale would] succeed to the estate only in the event
that the debtor outlived the other tenant by the entirety."' '  Massachusetts
takes a unique position to this problem by statutorily barring a creditor
from reaching the interest of the debtor spouse if the property is the
principal residence of the nondebtor spouse. Any other property is available
to satisfy the debts of the debtor spouse. 2 1
CONCLUSION
The question of who has priority in disputes over property used as
collateral is often answered by determining what interest the debtor has
in the property. Oftentimes, a secured party will take a security interest
in property only to find out at the crucial time-when the debtor has
defaulted on the loan-that a security interest does not exist because the
debtor did not have a sufficient interest in the property. To protect his
interests, a secured party should investigate the interest the debtor is claiming
in the property he is offering for collateral. The secured party should then
determine what his rights in the collateral would be should the debtor
119. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
120. In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir. 1985).
121. Missouri courts have held that one spouse acting alone cannot convey
any interest in tenancy by the entirety property. In re Newcomb, 744 F.2d 621(8th Cir. 1984); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Shackelford, Inc., 591
S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
Michigan courts have also adopted the Missouri position. See In re Grosslight,
757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).
122. In re Walls, 45 Bankr. 145, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Young,
42 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Stephenson, 19 Bankr. 185 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982); In re Tsunis, 29 Bankr. 527 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1983); Napotnich v.
Equibank & Parkvale Say. Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1982).
123. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209, § 1 (1980).
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default. Without the requisite ownership interest by the debtor, the secured
party is not a secured party at all.
JOSEPH W. TURNER
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